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The implementation of sustainable development principles often comes 
into conflict with government driven needs for greater economic growth.  The 
richly diverse Mekong Region–which comprises the six riparian nations of China, 
Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam–is in the midst of a regional 
debate between development and ecological preservation. The Mekong River 
Commission (MRC), the sole organization in the region tasked with managing this 
delicate balance, is struggling to find a balance between utilizing the Mekong’s 
waterways for economic growth without undermining the vitality of the river for 
use by future generations. In its 15 year history, the organization has never truly 
defined its basic principles on sustainability and has instead shifted positions as its 
leadership has changed. The MRC is also trapped in a difficult balance with its 
upstream neighbors; due to its limited authority, the MRC has been unable to 




Vision for the Basin: An Economically Prosperous, Socially Just and Environmentally  
sound Mekong River Basin.  
 
Vision for the Mekong River Commission: A world class, financially  
secure, international river basin organization serving the Mekong countries to  
achieve the basin vision.  
 
Mission of the MRC: To promote and coordinate sustainable management  
and development of water and related resources for the countries’ mutual  
benefit and people’s well being (MRC). 
 
 Sustainable development reverberates in policy discussions around the 
world. In practice, the implementation of sustainable development principles often 
comes into conflict with government driven needs for greater economic growth.  
The Mekong Region, comprising the six riparian nations of China, Burma, Laos, 
Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, is in the midst of a regional debate between 
development and ecological preservation. The sole organization in the region tasked 
with managing this delicate balance, the Mekong River Commission (MRC), is 
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struggling to find a balance between utilizing the Mekong’s waterways for economic 
growth without undermining the vitality of the river for use by future generations. 
 Ensuring the viability, history, and character of the basin system represents 
an enormous task for all professionals in conservation, sustainable development, and 
water resource management. Outside of China, the river basin in the lower Mekong 
remains close to its natural state. However, plans are being made to construct dams 
for hydropower and irrigation, improve river navigation for trade, and other policies 
that will change the nature of the river across the region. All of these changes are 
made in the name of pro-poor development.1 Yet, the poorest communities are often 
found on the banks of the Mekong and rely on the river’s natural abundance for 
their livelihoods. The MRC must find a balance between developing the basin and 
not destroying the natural resources the poor rely on. 
 Since the founding of the MRC in 1995, the organization has faced many 
questions about its role and ability to adequately address development concerns. In 
many ways, the MRC has been insular, focusing mainly on answering the needs and 
requests of its member nations’ governments and select partnering agencies. Its 
ability to absorb and respond to outside considerations (public requests) has been 
dependent on the character of the organization’s leadership. At the same time, the 
MRC has played a significant role in shaping the Mekong basin as the greatest 
opportunity for sustainable development, trade facilitation, and navigation. The 
MRC’s greatest challenge has been how to include into development plans the much 
less quantifiable but equally important roles of culture, the ecological system, and 
social structures of basin residents.  
 The question remains: How can the MRC use its knowledge and information 
base to facilitate dialogue between all parties (member governments, donors, and 
civil society), to coordinate and advise on sustainable development, and to manage 
water usage and resources of this rich ecological system for the benefit of the 
poorest, while maintaining the ecological integrity of the river system? Thus far, the 
MRC has not been able to adequately answer this question. It has done a poor job in 
its fundamental tasks of water management and sustainable development and has 
struggled to maintain dialogue with all parties. This article will demonstrate how the 
MRC’s changing understanding of sustainable development, along with its inability 
to coordinate information transfer, include public input, and influence national 
agendas, has hampered its ability to meet its stated mission. Beginning with a basic 
background of the MRC’s origins, this article will examine how the MRC has looked 
at sustainable development, water resource management, public participation, and 
role development. Finally, it will give some thoughts of what the future holds for the 
organization. 
 
2. The Founding of the Mekong River Commission 
 The MRC’s legacy can be traced back to geopolitics of the 1950s. Led by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United States Army Corp 
of Engineers, a United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(UNECAFE) study viewed the Mekong as one of the greatest “untamed” rivers 
whose waters must be controlled to limit flooding, produce electricity, and support 
development through a series of hydropower dams in the region. During a historical 
Consilience Ha: Regional Institutions 
period fraught with concern over the rise of Communism in Southeast Asia, 
development in the region had little to do with actual local needs; instead, 
development was seen as a strategy to fight Communism. Hence, hydropower plans 
developed by the US Corp of Engineers gave the United States a clear advantage 
over others in the region.   
 Following the decision to build a cascade of dams throughout the region, an 
agreement was signed in 1957 that established the MRC’s forerunner, the Mekong 
Committee, and included Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The committee’s 
main task during the time was to implement hydropower development plans 
throughout the region. During its early years, the committee predominantly surveyed, 
researched, and collected data for the construction of a series of hydropower dams 
throughout the basin. However, the committee could only complete a limited 
amount of work as Indochina (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) slipped into outright 
conflict in the 1960s and 1970s. Meetings were suspended and little work was 
completed. In 1975, with the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the grouping, without 
Cambodia (who at that time was under the closed Khmer Rouge regime) signed a 
new interim agreement that allowed the 3 countries to continue implementing 
hydropower development studies and construction. In all, a very limited number of 
dams were built, none of which were on the Mekong’s mainstream waterways.  
 In 1992, conflict in Cambodia ceased, and the country re-emerged from years 
of isolation. Consideration had to be made about where Cambodia fit into the 
existing 3 party Mekong Committee. However, since 1957, the economic make-up of 
the region had changed significantly. Thailand in particular was in the midst of great 
industrial growth and had become reliant on the river’s water. Several Thai 
development plans required diversions on the Mekong’s tributaries and mainstreams. 
However, the 1975 interim agreement contained specific clauses prohibiting the river 
water’s diversion without consent from other member countries.  For the first time 
in over a decade, Cambodia’s re-entry into the Committee as the country most 
immediately downstream of Thailand posed a potential threat to Thailand’s own 
economic plans. Thailand was fearful that Cambodia would object to its water 
diversion plans and therefore, objected to Cambodia’s re-entry. However, excluding 
a stable Cambodia would undermine the regional legitimacy of the organization. This 
impasse threatened the existence of the Mekong Committee, something that the 
UNDP could not allow to happen.  
 In this acrimonious atmosphere, negotiations led by the UNDP for a 
revitalized four member organization concluded in 1995 and established the current 
Mekong River Commission. The commission was tasked with ensuring sustainable 
development throughout the basin with explicit language to mitigate harm to the 
environment while protecting, preserving, and even enhancing its surroundings. The 
member countries’ governments heralded the Agreement as a great achievement.  
Within civil society, on the other hand, the 1995 Agreement was met with less 
enthusiasm. Although civil society applauded the agreement for establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and discussion, the Agreement failed to acknowledge the 
negative attributes of large scale industrial development and to explicitly discard 
hydropower plans for the Mekong region.2 As a result, the MRC had to continue 
reassessing its role in the Mekong Region.     
 Over the next 15 years, the MRC’s role and focus shifted as it struggled to 
define its position vis-à-vis other intergovernmental organizations and regional 
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bodies. Its main strength continued to be its ability to increase its already significant 
knowledge base by amassing large quantities of macro level data and observations on 
the technical aspects of the river basin. However, it struggled to utilize this 
knowledge base for actual sustainable development and water governance. 
 
3.  Sustainable Development 
 
 The 1995 Agreement that created the MRC was explicit in its goal towards, 
“sustainable development, utilization, conservation and management of the Mekong 
River Basin water and related resources… consistent with the needs to protect, 
preserve, enhance, and manage the environmental and aquatic conditions and 
maintenance of the ecological balance” (“1995 Agreement On the Cooperation for 
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin”). Within this framework, 
the MRC structure (Council, Joint Committee, National committees, and Secretariat) 
has been unable to present a coordinated work-plan meeting this objective. The 
MRC has found it particularly difficult to understand the implications of cross 
boundary programs in transportation, fisheries, hydropower, and irrigation. The very 
understanding of sustainable development and the degree of attention paid to 
environmental concerns and sustainability have been wholly dependent on the 
personalities of the MRC’s leadership. The MRC’s inability to institutionalize actual 
environmental and social considerations beyond the rhetoric undermines this 
element of the MRC’s core goals.      
 During the first years of its existence, the MRC, under the direction of 
Yanasabu Matoba, a former Japanese engineer, differed little from its predecessor, 
the Mekong Committee. Its 1996 Work Program included a list of infrastructure 
programs for investment. Many of these projects were recycled from lists 
constructed by the Mekong Committee focusing extensively on centralized 
infrastructure. Other considerations, including its mandate for water utilization, 
environment, and social mitigation programs were considered with no progress made 
until the early 2000s.    
 Following Matoba, Joern Christensen, was appointed the MRC’s Chief 
Executive Officer. During his tenure, from 2000-2004, development became much 
less project-specific. Instead, basin wide considerations were made with an emphasis 
on ecological conservation. Under Christensen, the Basin Development Plan was 
completed in 1999, and implementation began soon thereafter. The Basin 
Development Plan was one of the key projects stipulated by the 1995 Agreement. Its 
aim was to develop and coordinate development initiatives that would benefit all 
countries in the region by emphasizing cross border projects while also minimizing 
the possible negative impact associated with such projects. Sustainable development 
became less reliant on rapid infrastructural development and instead included 
consideration for basin wide resource management combined with social and 
environmental impacts. This did not mean a cessation of infrastructure projects, but 
greater attention was paid to the projects’ ecological ramifications. The environment, 
fisheries, and water utilization programs became integral for determining how the 
development agenda could be reconciled with socio-economic growth, a stark 
departure from preceding years.  
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 By the mid-2000s, the basic frameworks and procedures for the MRC had 
been concluded.3 While the early 2000s were marked by basin wide management and 
integration of environmental and social considerations into development plans, the 
second half of the decade saw an increase in concrete investment and development 
projects. Under the MRC’s third CEO, Olivier Cogels, concrete action became the 
major concern. In 2005, he wrote, “the MRC is in an ideal position to act as a 
promoter and facilitator of well-coordinated investments in the water and water 
related sectors of the region, in close cooperation with the donor community and 
investment institutions” (Cogels, 2005). In this model, greater cooperation with both 
the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) became integral. 4  
“Sustainable Development” now meant concrete projects in hydropower, navigation, 
fisheries, irrigated agriculture, environmental management, watershed management, 
etc.5 During this period, project completion, with a nod to sustainable development 
was extremely popular among riparian governments.   
 By 2008, under its current CEO, Jeremy Bird, the MRC once again shifted 
positions. Greater consideration is now given to the social and environmental 
impacts related to project implementation. Core practices now include determining 
mainstream acceptable practices for hydropower development. The MRC’s new 
project to develop a strategic environmental assessment is indicative of its current 
efforts to pay more attention to the environmental ramifications of development 
projects. Over the past few years, greater attention has also been paid to impacts on 
one of the most diverse fisheries in the world, accounting for one quarter of global 
freshwater fishing and worth over 2.5 billion USD annually (MRC). The MRC’s 
latest two initiatives, Basin Wide Development Scenarios 2010 and its Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (Opportunities and Risks) for Proposed Lower Mekong 
Basin Mainstream Dams, takes a much more critical view of the impacts that 
development will have on the make-up of the region. The Basin Wide Development 
Scenarios 2010 looks at three cases: the baseline situation, the definite future 
scenario, and foreseeable future scenario. In each of these scenarios, the MRC has 
assessed how development plans created throughout the region will impact 
livelihoods, fisheries, hydrology, etc. The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
on the other hand, analyzes for the first time the impact of mainstream hydropower 
construction on the communities, fisheries, and hydrology of the region. The SEA 
was recently released in October 2010 and actually found that hydropower plans 
should be halted for at least ten years because they could lead to irreparable harm 
(“Dams Spell Doom,” 2010). With greater emphasis on the social and environmental 
impacts of project implementation, the MRC has made significant strides in recent 
years towards sustainable development.     
 The MRC’s understanding of sustainable development has changed through 
the years, and its evolution has not followed a linear path. Instead, the balance 
between how much environmental and social issues would be considered in the need 
for overall development depended predominantly on the personality of the MRC’s 
CEOs. During its first years, the MRC was concerned with continuing with previous 
hydropower plans. During subsequent years, the MRC shifted back and forth 
between developing more comprehensive and balanced development agendas and 
completing large centralized infrastructure projects. Recent years have seen a return 
to social and environmental considerations for project completion, though much 
progress remains.  
130 Consilience 
 
4. Water Resource Management 
 
 The MRC’s second major task is to manage the water resources afforded by 
the Mekong River for the betterment of the communities it serves. In this respect, 
the MRC has followed a step-wise approach by passing a series of procedures 
dictated by the 1995 Agreement. The 1995 Agreement explicitly spelled out the 
MRC’s role in facilitating water use, determining the causes of disruptions, and 
facilitating disputes if they were to occur. The MRC also sought to increase dialogue 
with upstream Mekong countries, Burma and China, as a key cornerstone for water 
resource management. Yet this effort met only limited success in facilitating greater 
transparency in water use. In the end, the MRC’s effectiveness in water management 
was greatly hampered because the 1995 Agreement set out procedures that were not 
rules based and lacked real enforcement mechanisms. In essence, the MRC was 
unable to influence the national policies of its member countries. 
 Although the MRC initiated its water utilization program in 1996, it was not 
until 2003-2006 that the majority of its stated mandates were completed, including 
Procedures for Water Use Monitoring, Prior Consultation and Agreement, and Maintenance on the 
Flows on the Mainstream. Another mandate, known as Procedures for Water Quality, is 
currently still awaiting approval. The delay in these procedures led to Thailand’s 1995 
diversion of water from the Mekong mainstream for its own purposes and 
uncoordinated development along the river. As in the 1995 Agreement, the 
procedures are not rules based and member states are not bound to act by the 
procedures.             
 Along with these procedures, the MRC has also developed a variety of 
modeling mechanisms and programs to focus its work. The current model is the 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) to complement its hydrological 
modeling under the Decision Support Framework. The IWRM in theory, “promotes 
the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, 
in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable 
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (“Mekong 
Water Resources Assistance Strategy,” 2007). By utilizing the IWRM, the MRC 
notionally acknowledges the need for both a bottom-up and top-down approach. 
Nevertheless, the actual implementation of the program relies on the organization’s 
ability to influence riparian governments’ policies, something that has not yet 
happened. The individual national Mekong committees are more concerned with 
national interests than the MRC’s regional role, thus straining relations among 
members.            
 The MRC’s relations with its upstream countries, Burma and China, have led 
to some agreements between the parties for greater information sharing. However, it 
still took over ten years for China to agree to provide 24 hour water level and 12 
hour rainfall data for flood forecasts. Only following this year’s major drought has 
China agreed to release limited data from two of its upstream dams. The fact that it 
took 15 years for China to agree to minimal data release is a testament to the 
relationship the MRC has with its upper riparian neighbor.  
 These two aspects-the organization’s inability to affect real domestic policy 
changes in its riparian governments and insufficient information sharing with its 
upstream neighbors-limit any real affect the MRC can have on water use 
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management. Without effective water use management, the second core objective of 
the MRC cannot be met, leading to disruptions in water flow and depletion of water 
resources. For the communities living along the river who are reliant on its natural 
water flows, massive changes in expected water flows (both unforeseen), droughts, 
and floods have led to diminishing livelihoods.  
 
5. Public Participation 
 
 One of the greatest challenges the MRC faces is its relationship with the 
public. More than any other issue, the MRC’s inconsistent policy and the original 
disregard for public participation led many to question its legitimacy and 
effectiveness. By not engaging with the public, the MRC severely limited its own 
ability to adequately assess the needs of the people living along the Mekong. Without 
public input in its projects, civil society protested against the opaque decision making 
process that they believed benefited large private developers over their own needs. 
This undermined the MRC’s objectives to effectively manage the resources of the 
Mekong for residents in the area. 
 The core problem is that the MRC is only directly accountable to the four 
riparian governments, not to the general public. During the 1990s, the MRC took a 
particularly aloof stance. Its first CEO, Yanasabu Matoba, stated, “Public 
participation is not the responsibility of the MRC but that of its member countries,” 
further noting that if the public needed information it must, “go to the embassies of 
the member countries or through the donors” (“Letters,” 1996). The utter exclusion 
of public participation in the MRC secretariat’s planning process was an inauspicious 
beginning to relations between the MRC and the public. Rather than seeing the 
public and civil society as key actors and allies, the dismissive nature of these first 
years fostered hostility and mistrust between the parties.  
 Given the extremely different stages of political freedom and participation of 
its member states, the MRC has been unable to sustain public participation in its 
programs. Certain less contentious projects (environmental and basin development 
plans) include built-in mechanisms for dialogue and consultations with the public, 
while others (water utilization program) exclude the public completely. For example, 
the current Basin Development Plan and the State of the Basin Report both hold a 
series of stakeholder sessions to share preliminary results, garner feedback, and make 
amendments throughout the process. In April 2010, a representative from the MRC 
even attended a civil society forum to share the latest developments of the Basin 
Development Plan and to hear differing viewpoints. Still a key avenue for public 
engagement, the National Mekong Committees have failed to implement a 
mechanism for open dialogue. The Committees are established by each of the 
national governments. For Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, where public participation 
is a new concept, there is little precedent for establishing arenas for public dialogue.  
Instead, the National Mekong Committees are treated as merely another bureaucratic 
organization.  
 It was not until 2009 that the MRC responded concretely to the problem by 
issuing a new communications strategy. This strategy explicitly declared the need for 
greater discussion, dissemination of information, publication of the MRC’s roles, and 
the need to establish avenues for public feedback on projects.6 By 2009, after nearly 
132 Consilience 
 
two decades of turmoil over the lack of information coming from the MRC, its new 
CEO, Jeremy Bird (who had previously been head of the World Commission on 
Dams) saw the vital need for a better communication strategy with the public. Over 
the years, public participation was a repeated refrain from both civil society and the 
donor community. Bird recognized donor demands as well as the importance of a 
coherent communications strategy from his previous position. Being accustomed to 
dealing with controversial issues, he realized the MRC must address these concerns 
and improve its information sharing. Over the past year, the MRC has released 
policy studies, posted meeting notes, and held stakeholder forums. Hopefully this 
genuine approach and engagement with the public will continue.   
 
6. Its role: Knowledge Development, Investment, 
Regulation, and Coordination 
 
 Most importantly perhaps is the image and overall role of the MRC. Over the 
course of 15 years it has developed, accommodated, and changed itself depending on 
pressures from governments, donors, and civil society. Striving to meet multiple 
objectives- including managing water resource information, coordinating activities, 
notifying members, and playing prominent advisory roles on sustainable 
development– these goals remain largely unmet.   
 
6.1 Knowledge Development and Consulting 
 
 From its very inception, the MRC has been a knowledge organization. Work 
since the 1950s resulted in a vast quantity of information on fishery levels, 
environmental surveys, water levels, etc. Many of its programs today continue to 
fulfill this purpose, since the MRC sees itself as a repository for technological 
knowledge about the river’s resources and flows. Yet, it still lacks a depth of 
knowledge on the cultures and histories of communities along its banks that were 
originally deemed unimportant in its work. Stretching from China into Vietnam, the 
Mekong passes through villages and communities that are both among the poorest as 
well as most diverse. These include small fishing communities on the borders of 
Laos and Thailand, ethnic minority groups, and floating villages in Cambodia and 
Vietnam. Historically, these communities have relied on the river’s natural ebb and 
flow for their livelihoods. Most dependent are the floating villages on the Tonle Sap 
(Great Lake) in Cambodia where the river naturally reverses its flow every year, 
yielding one of the largest fisheries in the world. Recently, the MRC has tried to 
increase its knowledge by publishing the Living Mekong, a volume documenting the 
rich diversity of communities and fisheries along its banks, but more should be done 
to effectively engage with these communities.   
 As a knowledge organization, the MRC has used its role to act as a consultant 
and advisor for projects with the World Bank and ADB as well as to advise member 
countries. This has manifested into a number of consultancies with international 
financial institutions on pre-feasibility reports for the MRC as well as environmental 
studies for local member organizations. Recently, it has also begun to delve into 
developing recommendations for cross- border infrastructure projects across the 
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region, acknowledging the need for greater environmental and societal 
considerations. At the forefront of all infrastructure projects is a cascade of dams on 
the mainstream. The MRC’s “Sustainable Hydropower” program came about as 
Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia looked to build 11 mainstream Mekong dams. The 
MRC recognized that the completion of these 11 dams would change the very 
character of the Mekong river basin, leading to potentially catastrophic 
environmental and social considerations due to collapsed fisheries, relocations of 
communities, and a complete change in the ecology of  not just a single country, but 
the entire region.  
 
6.2 Private Investment 
 
 The MRC has also played a role in attracting investment for development 
projects. Over time, this has moved from collaboration with international financial 
institutions towards projects with private investors. The shift became prominent 
particularly under Olivier Cogel’s administration. The importance of the private 
sector’s increasing role in the Mekong basin is a significant challenge for the MRC.  
This is particularly true as private investors such as Chinese, Russian, and regional 
financiers and companies enter the market for hydropower development. As 
development organizations, such as the ADB, promote public-private partnerships, 
private entities play an increasing role in determining development projects. In doing 
so, Jeremy Bird, notes, “The planning cycle for private sector projects tends to be 
much shorter than in the public sector, and less open” (“Changing Currents: 
Navigating the Mekong’s past, present, and future,” 2008). With the private sector 
playing a greater role, the MRC must reassess its position in development programs 
and determine its relationship with private entities. However, this shift from a basin 
management and a knowledge coordination organization towards an investment 
attraction organization does not fit donors’ conceptions of the organization. Instead, 
donors believe it should play the role of a manager and facilitator amongst 
governments rather than a project oriented organization (Donor Group Statement, 





 The MRC has also played a role in attracting investment for development 
projects. Over time, this has moved from collaboration with international financial 
institutions towards projects with private investors. The shift became prominent 
particularly under Olivier Cogel’s administration. The importance of the private 
sector’s increasing role in the Mekong basin is a significant challenge for the MRC.  
This is particularly true as private investors such as Chinese, Russian, and regional 
financiers and companies enter the market for hydropower development. As 
development organizations, such as the ADB, promote public-private partnerships, 
private entities play an increasing role in determining development projects. In doing 
so, Jeremy Bird, notes, “The planning cycle for private sector projects tends to be 
much shorter than in the public sector, and less open” (“Changing Currents,” 2008). 
With the private sector playing a greater role, the MRC must reassess its position in 
134 Consilience 
 
development programs and determine its relationship with private entities. However, 
this shift from a basin management and a knowledge coordination organization 
towards an investment attraction organization does not fit donors’ conceptions of 
the organization. Instead, donors believe it should play the role of a manager and 
facilitator amongst governments rather than a project oriented organization (“Donor 
Group Statement, 10th Meeting of the MRC-Donor Consultative Group”).  
 
6.4 Knowledge Management and Coordination 
 
 Even without a true regulator’s role, the MRC as a knowledge base, advisor, 
and coordination center can do much more to highlight and regulate water flows.  
Yet, it continues to fail to successfully investigate, monitor, and notify governments 
of impending disasters. One of the prime examples is the Yali Falls Dam built 80 km 
upstream of the Cambodia-Vietnam border. Between 1999 and 2001, when partial 
operation of the dam commenced, flash floods destroyed fields and vegetable 
gardens while also leading to a number of deaths in Ratanikiri, Cambodia. It was only 
when local reports from Ratanikiri emerged that the MRC responded. Even then, the 
MRC’s could only take undertake several field studies to meet with the Vietnamese 
and Cambodian Mekong National Committee members to set up better 
communication and cooperation mechanisms. It was clear that the MRC’s position 
was limited; it could merely bring sides together but not force changes (“Cooperation 
for Sustainable Development,” 2000).  
 In 2010, the Mekong basin faced its most severe drought in close to 20 years.  
Water flows and levels were considerably below average. The MRC claimed the low 
water levels were due to an unusually dry rainy season that ended in October, 2009.  
Holding this knowledge internally, the MRC made no public statement until local 
media began reporting on drought conditions. This inability to coordinate and share 
information or make early warnings was indicative of its communications and 
systemic failures. Even if seen solely as a knowledge organization, the MRC failed to 
meet its objectives. For the most part, the MRC has managed its large technical 
knowledge base to assist in member country and international financial institutional 
projects; however, it has struggled to adequately coordinate information transfer 
especially during times of crises.   
 
7. The Future of Regional Cooperation 
 
 The MRC provides a good case study of the difficulties facing regional 
organizations tasked with managing water resources and sustainable development in 
a trans-boundary context. The commission’s complex agenda among its four 
member states combined with finding a way to engage with its two upstream non-
member neighbors make its mission particularly difficult. Combined with regional 
and international interest in the Mekong from the ADB and WB, the MRC has 
struggled to find its niche in the development world. The MRC offers a number of 
lessons including the following: the importance of effective communications 
amongst governments and the public, true public engagement, the need for a 
mechanism to adequately enforce implementation of recommendations and 
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decisions, clearly defined understanding of development and real sustainability, and 
lessons in dealing with the geopolitics of upstream and downstream neighboring 
countries. Although it has made mistakes in the past, the MRC is also shifting 
positions and reforming itself for the future. 
 After years of foreign leadership, the MRC is shifting towards riparianization, 
meaning the riparian states (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) will have 
greater power in the decision-making process. In the upcoming years, the CEO and 
other key positions will be turned over to a riparian country national rather than 
expat leadership. Decreased term limits for professional staff will also be amended to 
increase dedication and professionalization of the organization. This fundamental 
shift in the organization’s everyday working structure will further increase riparian 
governments’ ownership of the organization.  
 These changes will, however, lead to more questions. Most significant of 
these questions will be whether this latest attempt at inclusivity will be 
institutionalized and continued by later regimes. How the secretariat manages its 
relationship with national governments will also change as the organization moves 
ahead. Time will tell whether increasing riparian ownership of the MRC will lead to 
greater cooperation or greater manipulation of the Secretariat as a tool of national 
agendas. The MRC stands at a pivotal moment when it must take a more assertive 
stand in using its knowledge to promote sustainable development and equitable 
water use in the basin. As dialogue on global warming increases, the MRC will need 
to find a truly equitable strategy that will enable it to meet the changes brought by 
global warming. It should also endeavor to implement water resource management 
that does not destroy the ecological system and livelihoods of those in the basin, 
while simultaneously alleviating poverty for the very poorest.  
 Steadily over the past 15 years, the MRC has expanded its core strength as a 
knowledge institution in regards to technical and scientific data. At the same time, it 
has struggled to define its role in “sustainable development,” to effectively 
coordinate information transfer and to establish its public presence. In the past, 
much of this was due to a nonexistent communications strategy and shunning of 
public engagement. This is beginning to change, as the MRC recently passed a new 
communications strategy that establishes avenues for public input, responds to 
inquests, and utilizes the internet for information dissemination. It has also started 
taking more comprehensive steps to understand a dam’s impact on fisheries, 
sedimentation, and overall ecological impacts while issuing guidelines for further 
“sustainable hydropower” development. These are improvements, but they also 
signify the continued belief in the centrality of large scale infrastructure for 
development.   
 The original question of how to use its knowledge base to increase 
environmental and social considerations and manage water resources has still not 
been adequately answered. At present, the MRC’s attempts have been inconsistent 
and dependent on the nature of its leadership. The true institutionalization of 
sustainability, environmental considerations, public participation and discourse has 
not yet occurred. Consequently, the regional organization established to both 
coordinate and advise on basin wide development has had little impact on the 
decision making of its national members, nor has it been responsive to civil society 
and local societal needs. This has led to uneven development with potentially 
disastrous long term effects.  
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 The MRC has, thus far, failed to fulfill its vision for the Mekong Basin.  
Sustainable development for the poorest Mekong residents still has a long way to go. 
In addition, its inability to coordinate information transfer about water fluctuations 
impacting the entire basin has resulted in greater hardship for large swathes of 
communities. The struggles that were noted above have hampered the MRC from 
undertaking projects that are both sustainable and beneficial to the wellbeing of 
citizens living on the banks of the Mekong. While large-scale infrastructure and 
agriculture projects have resulted in greater overall economic growth for the Mekong 
countries, greater income inequalities have also emerged in the basin, exacerbating 
local challenges. As the basin’s nations continue down a path towards rapid 
economic growth, more pressure will be placed on the river system. Currently, 11 
mainstream hydropower projects are planned in Laos and Cambodia with potentially 
severe impacts on fish migration and the overall ecology of the basin. How the MRC 
navigates these projects will set precedence for the future and define its role in the 
basin. The MRC will need to confront and address its systemic failures in order to 
ensure that it may not only adequately manage the Mekong’s development and water 







                                                 
1 Pro-poor development: policies aimed specifically at benefitting the livelihoods of 
the poorest communities and individuals in the region.  
 
2 Please see “Statement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin.” 4 April 1995, Chiang Rai, Thailand.  
http://www.terraper.org/key_issues_view.php?id=14.  The grouping of Thai Civil 
society organizations stressed, “an end to the era of environmental destruction and 
the beginning of an era of sustainability that does not damage the natural 
environment and which benefits all members of society … a holistic approach and 
the decentralization of authority to local communities must replace the concept of 
large scale water development centralized within the State.”  
 
3 The different procedures included: Procedures for data and information exchange 
and sharing, water use monitoring, and notification for prior consultation and 
agreement.  
 
4 The IUCN and WWF also became cooperation partners during this same period.  
Today, twenty-seven organizations are amongst the Mekong Commission’s 
development partners. They encompass a wide array of organizations from NGOs to 
intergovernmental organizations.  
 
5 In fact, the Cogel administration was notable for its control of information and was 
charged with withholding negative environmental reports.  Please see “13 Years of 
Consilience Ha: Regional Institutions 
                                                                                                                                     
Bad luck: a relfection on the MRC and civil society in the Mekong.” Watershed. Vol. 
12, No. 3, November 2008 for further information.  Cogels also explicitly defended 
the building of hydropower dams, finding them critical for the region. 
http://www.mrcmekong.org/mrc_news/speeches/30-nov-06_open.htm. 
 
6   Please see new communications strategy,  
http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/free_download/MRC-communication-
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